

Open Trust Protocol (OTrP)

Technical and RFC Draft

12th October 2016

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OTrP Spec History


- Joint effort from Open Trust Protocol Alliance founding member companies
 - ARM, Intercede, Solacia, Symantec
- A message protocol to define trust hierarchy and Trusted Application (TA) management over the air by SP via TSM
 - Basing on standard PKI
 - Trust establishment from end-to-end
 - FW → TEE → TA → TSM / SP
 - Allow different TEE and TSM with trust selection
- Open standards
 - RFC Draft: July 8, 2016, 96-th IETF
 - <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-pei-opentrustprotocol-01>
 - Global Platform submission consideration

Background Context

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- Challenges and Proposals

Trusted Execution Environment and TAs




The Challenge


How to access hardware security when fragmentation is growing?

- Adoption gap for service providers: gap between devices with hardware security and a wish to push keys/Trusted Apps to devices with different TEEs and vendors
- Fragmentation is growing – IOT will accelerate that fragmentation
- Lack of standards to manage TAs
 - Devices have hardware based Trusted Execution Environments (TEE) but they do not have a standard way of managing those security domains/TAs
 - e.g. how to install / delete a Trusted App?

Open Trust Ecosystem



Solution: Open Trust Protocol



OTrP Design Goals

- Simplify trusted provisioning of connected devices
- Designed to work with *any* “hardware secure environment”
 - Starting with TrustZone based TEE with wide potential in Mobile and IOT
- Creating a free specification for industry use
- Focus on re-use of existing schemes (CA and PKI) and ease of implementation (keeping message protocol high level)

Benefits of OTrP

Built-in Trust and Privacy

- Device Trusted Firmware and TEE identity information is never exposed to Client Applications
- Device generated key for runtime anonymous attestation

Interoperability & Easy Adoption

- Reduce cost of research and development through royalty-free, open standards-based specifications, technical collaboration and solution component integration

Scalability

- Flexible model that relies on independent certification and managed trust

No “Vendor Lock”

- Open ecosystem that offers broader vendor choice for flexible, best-in-class solution deployment

Innovation


- Service Providers can focus on added-value and best use of hardware security capabilities

OTrP RFC Spec

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Basic Concept


- Open and Secure framework for Over-The-Air management of Secure Keys and Trusted Application (TA)
- Based on the standard **PKI (Public Key Infrastructure)**
 - ✓ PKI trust anchors embedded in end-points and configured in services
- Attestation between TAM and TEE-device with Key pair and Certificate for remote integrity check
- Cryptography based authentication with certified asymmetric device keys



Technical Spec Content

- **Define trust relationship of entities**
- **Define JSON messages for trust and remote TA management** between a TSM and TEE
 - Messages for device attestation (device integrity check) by a TSM and a device to trust a TSM
 - Messages for Security domain management and TA management
 - Network communication among entities are left to implementations
- **Define an OTrP Agent in REE (Rich Execution Environment)**
 - Necessary component from REE of a device to relay message exchanges between a TSM and TEE
- Use standard PKI artifacts and algorithms
- Use standard JSON messages and JSON security RFCs


Entity Key Architecture and Trust Model




* AIK: Attestation Identity Key, TFW: Trusted Firmware

OTrP System Architecture

- CA issues certificates to all OTrP Components (TEE, TAM, TFW, SP)
- TAM vendor provides the SDK to communicate with TAM from Client Application
- TAM communicates with OTrP Agent to relay the OTrP message between TAM and TEE




OTrP Spec Scope



OTrP Agent

- Responsible for routing OTrP Messages to the appropriate TEE
- Most commonly developed and distributed by TEE vendor
- Implements an interface as a service, SDK, etc.



OTrP Agent API

```
interface IOTrPAgentService {  
    String processMessage(String tsmInMsg) throws OTrPAgentException;  
    String getTAInformation(String spid, String taid, byte[] nonce);  
}  
  
public class OTrPAgentException extends Throwable {  
    private int errCode;  
}
```

OTrP Operations and Messages

✓ Remote Device Attestation

Command	Descriptions
GetDeviceState	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Retrieve information of TEE device state including SD and TA associated to a TAM

✓ Security Domain Management


Command	Descriptions
CreateSD	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Create SD in the TEE associated to a TAM
UpdateSD	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Update sub-SD within SD or SP related information
DeleteSD	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Delete SD or SD related information in the TEE associated to a TAM

✓ Trusted Application Management

Command	Descriptions
InstallTA	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Install TA in the SD associated to a TAM
UpdateTA	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Update TA in the SD associated to a TAM
DeleteTA	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Delete TA in the SD associated to a TAM

Protocol Flow

- Security of the Operation Protocol is enhanced by applying the following three Measures:
 - ✓ Verifies validity of Message **Sender's Certificate**
 - ✓ Verifies signature of Message **Sender to check immutability**
 - ✓ Encrypted to guard against exposure of Sensitive data



JSON Message Security and Crypto Algorithms

- Use JSON signing and encryption RFCs
 - RFC 7515, JSON Web Signature (JWS)
 - RFC 7516, JSON Web Encryption (JWE)
 - RFC 7517, JSON Web Key (JWK)
 - RFC 7518, JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)
- Supported encryption algorithms
 - A128CBC-HS256
 - A256CBC-HS512
- Supported signing algorithms
 - RS256 (RSA 2048-bit key)
 - ES256 (ECC P-256)
- Examples
 - {"alg":"RS256"}
 - {"alg":"ES256"}
 - {"enc":"A128CBC-HS256"}

OTrP JSON Message Format and Convention

```
{  
  "<name>[Request | Response]": {  
    "payload": "<payload contents of <name>TBS[Request | Response]>",  
    "protected": "<integrity-protected header contents>",  
    "header": "<non-integrity-protected header contents>",  
    "signature": "<signature contents>"  
  }  
}
```

For example:

- CreateSDRequest
- CreateSDResponse

OTrP JSON Sample Message: GetDeviceState

```
{
  "GetDeviceStateTBSRequest": {
    "ver": "1.0",
    "rid": "<Unique request ID>",
    "tid": "<transaction ID>",
    "ocspdat": "<OCSP stapling data of TSM certificate>",
    "icaocspdat": "<OCSP stapling data for TSM CA certificates>",
    "supportedsigalgs": "<comma separated signing algorithms>"
  }
}

{
  "GetDeviceStateRequest": {
    "payload": "<BASE64URL encoding of the GetDeviceStateTBSRequest JSON above>",
    "protected": "<BASE64URL encoded signing algorithm>",
    "header": {
      "x5c": "<BASE64 encoded TSM certificate chain up to the root CA certificate>"
    },
    "signature": "<signature contents signed by TSM private key>"
  }
}
```

OTrP Sample Message: CreateSD Request

```
{
  "CreateSDTBSRequest": {
    "ver": "1.0",
    "rid": "<unique request ID>",
    "tid": "<transaction ID>", // this may be from prior message
    "tee": "<TEE routing name from the DSI for the SD's target>",
    "nextdsi": "true | false",
    "dsihash": "<hash of DSI returned in the prior query>",
    "content": ENCRYPTED { // this piece of JSON data will be encrypted
      "spid": "<SP ID value>",
      "sdname": "<SD name for the domain to be created>",
      "spcert": "<BASE64 encoded SP certificate>",
      "tsmid": "<An identifiable attribute of the TSM certificate>",
      "did": "<SHA256 hash of the TEE cert>"
    }
  }
}
```

OTrP Sample Message: CreateSD Response

```
{
  "CreateSDTBSResponse": {
    "ver": "1.0",
    "status": "<operation result>",
    "rid": "<the request ID received>",
    "tid": "<the transaction ID received>",
    "content": ENCRYPTED {
      "reason": "<failure reason detail>", // optional
      "did": "<the device id received from the request>",
      "sdname": "<SD name for the domain created>",
      "teespaik": "<TEE SP AIK public key, BASE64 encoded>",
      "dsi": "<Updated TEE state, including all SD owned by this TSM>"
    }
  }
}
```


Thank you!

Q&A

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